Abstract: Presently, mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) are being used extensively in the defense, private, domestic, etc. fields and each of these emulates a personal area network (PAN). A MANET does not require any infrastructure; moreover, it can behave as a mobile network. These features have boosted the popularity of MANETs in the community.
Introduction
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) [1] is an autonomous collection of mobile nodes that communicate over wireless links, with limited bandwidth and battery power. The applications of MANETs range widely from search and rescue operations to personal area networks (PANs). Since MANETs do not depend on fixed infrastructures and central authority, they are quite applicable in various fields as mentioned in [2, 3] . However, the nodes deployed in these applications have limited battery power and are vulnerable to different attacks [4] .
Due to these vulnerabilities, MANETs demand secure routing protocols, which can mitigate such malicious activities. While providing security to the message these secure routing protocols often degrade the quality of service (QoS) [5] of the network. Hence, a tradeoff is always required between security and QoS of the network. Moreover, the limited battery life of nodes necessitate more energy efficient routing protocols. In this paper, we have proposed a more secure and energy efficient routing protocol that is easily deployable in practical scenarios, with minimum trade-offs.
Developing real-life applications for MANETs still demands cardinal attention from the research community. The existing hardware applications [6] [7] [8] are neither energy efficient nor secure nor low cost. Hence, the main goal is to build a low-cost PAN that can effectively use the proposed protocol. To measure the effectiveness, we have measured the packet delivery fraction (PDF), i.e. total number of received data packets to total number of sent data packets. We have measured the normalized routing load (NRL), i.e. total number of sent routing packets to total number of received data packets. Finally, we have measured the end-to-end delay, i.e. time to send the data packets from source to destination to the total number of data packets sent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the existing secure routing protocols and the hardware implementations. Section 3 introduces the protocol model, along with fidelity and battery threshold calculations in sections 4 and 5, respectively. Sections 6 and 7 explain the hardware environment and experimental results. In section 8, we provide a performance comparison of the protocol followed by the conclusion in section 9.
Related work
In this section, we present some popular existing secure routing protocols along with their shortcomings and some of the existing hardware implementations.
Some secure routing protocols use authentication schemes that sentinel against modification of routing packets. Sanzgiri et al. [9] have proposed authenticated routing for ad hoc networks (ARANs), which use asymmetric cryptography. Although the protocol maintains a high PDF, it requires extra memory and high processing overhead for encryption and the discovered path may not be optimal. Defrawy et al. [10] have proposed anonymous location aided routing in MANET (ALARM), in which nodes are grouped on a location basis and are led by a group manager. The node communication cannot be traced and hence provides protection against outsider and insider attacks. However, it incurs lot of cost and hence is not suitable in large networks. Wan et al. [11] have proposed the unobservable secure on-demand routing protocol (UBSOR), which achieves high privacy in reactive routing. It hides the content of the packets by encryption methods. However, it needs third parties to establish the key and cannot handle wormhole attacks.
Some secure routing protocols assign quantitative and qualitative trust values to the network based on observed behavior of the nodes. Zapta et al. [12] have proposed the secure ad hoc on demand distance vector (SAODV), which uses digital signatures to authenticate nonmutable fields of the routing control messages and one-way hash chains, thereby securing hop count information. The protocol is resilient against attacks like Dos and Blackhole. However, there are possibilities of MIM [13] attacks. Li et al. [14] have proposed the trusted ad hoc on demand distance vector (TAODV) routing protocol. It uses trust recommendations, later on combining these to derive a logical conclusion. The computational overhead of each operation is high, and it may even lead to high traffic when there are many malicious nodes. Wang et al. [15] have presented a scheme that uses Kalman filter-based aggregation and prediction. Trust is considered a continuous variable bounded in an interval. However, it incurs additional computational complexity in implementing the Kalman filter. Moreover, the protocol may not give good results when the correlation coefficient is less between different observed samples. Cheng et al. [16] have presented a rendezvous-based trust propagation protocol. Here the performance metric is the probability of malicious node detected. It incurs less overhead compared to flooding-based methods, with minimal complexity. However, the trust convergence time is higher compared to the flooding-based approach.
Saha et al. [17] have proposed the fidelity based on demand (FBOD) routing protocol, which is based on the concept of fidelity. The approach reduces the computational overhead to a large extent. However, the protocol cannot deal with blackmail attacks, nor can it deal with greyhole attacks effectively.
Some secure routing protocols are concentrated on detecting and eliminating a particular attack. Choi et al. [18] have presented a protocol, wormhole attack prevention (WAP), which not only detects the fake route, but also adopts preventive measures against wormhole nodes from reappearing during the route discovery phase. Chhabra et al. [19] proposed a protocol to prevent and handle distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks in the networks as early as possible and before reaching the victim. However, these kinds of protocols cannot mitigate other attacks and have high overheads.
Some protocols have been implemented in hardware. Sharmila et al. [6] have conducted a hardware implementation of SAODV, and have proposed a novel technique by using a Virtex IV device from the Xilinx family. The delay and power consumed have been compared with AODV in the hardware platform. Dalu et al. [7] have proposed a physical implementation of a topology control algorithm for MANETs. The proposed algorithm maintains the topology without any control message. Passarella and Delmastro [8] have proposed a real implementation of group-communication applications. They have presented a prototype implementation of a whiteboard application. The prototype includes the networking support required by the whiteboard, and thus can be used to test it in a real test bed.
Hence, it has been observed that none of the existing secure routing protocols or the hardware implementations can handle the energy constraints or mitigate all types of attacks. Moreover, these existing hardware implementations are neither cheap nor easily deployable.
EMFBOD model
In this section, we discuss the algorithm along with the routing details of the protocol, energy-aware modified fidelity based on-demand (EMFBOD), referring to Figure 1 . A new self-organized key management scheme as proposed in [20] has been implemented, since it uses less memory space. It has been assumed that the source and destination nodes are nonmalicious nodes; otherwise no communication can be successful. In the neighbor searching process, a node initializes its neighbor table, by broadcasting neighbor request (NREQ) packets. A node waits for time, τ 1 = 2 × (average network delay) , for the neighbor reply (NREP) packets to arrive. Network delay is the time required by a packet to travel from one node to another. It consists of the processing, queuing, transmission, and propagation delays. We have considered the average network delay as 1.5 s from experimental results. A NREQ packet will travel from one node to another and then an NREP packet will travel back. Hence, the total waiting time will be two times the average network delay.
A source initiates the communication by selecting nodes based on fidelity and battery judgement as explained in sections 4 and 5. The source node then sends a route request (RREQ) packet and waits for τ 2 = 2× (average network delay) × (network diameter) for the RREP packet to arrive. Network diameter is the maximum number of hops possible in the network, which is (N -1), where N is the number of nodes in the network. After the destination node receives the RREQ packet, it forwards a route reply (RREP) packet back through the same route. Each intermediate node forwards this RREP packet to the last hop and waits for τ 3 = 2× (average network delay) × (hop count) for the data to arrive. The hop count is the length of this selected route. When the source node receives and verifies the RREP packet, it encrypts the data and sends it to the next hop, and waits for τ 3 for the acknowledgment (ACK) packet to arrive. If at any point the ACK is not received or a report is received, the node will decrease the fidelity by one and then broadcasts recommendation against that node, otherwise increasing the fidelity by one. If there are three unique recommendations from three different nodes about a node, then that node is sent into a blacklist (BL), as explained in section 4.
Step 5 of the intermediate node algorithm is the criterion for selecting a set of nodes A(N) from the neighbor table NT(N) as trustworthy nodes. This A(N) set is constantly updated when nodes in that set fail to give a route for a particular source-destination pair. The fail array FA(N) is the set of nodes reported by neighbors through fail messages, which have failed to give a route for a particular source-destination pair. S(N) is the fail array to be sent back to the originator. Step 5: else
Algorithm for an intermediate node

Send Fail Message(l,S); //send Fail Message along with fail array to node l
Step 6: Stop.
Fidelity concept
In this section, we explain fidelity and the decisions associated with it. Fidelity is a measure of how much a node (say) A trusts a neighboring node (say) B over another neighboring node (say) C, while transmitting a data packet to its destination. Thus, it is not an absolute concept but varies with respect to node to node. Let node B have a fidelity value φ BA with respect to A, while C has a value φ CA with respect to A. Node A selects the node with maximum fidelity.
Fidelity modification can be of two types, based on the type of packet coming in:
• Direct fidelity: If an ACK packet is received and verified, then the φ is incremented, which indicates the reception of the data packet by the destination node. However, if no ACK packet is received within timeout or a report packet is received, then the φ is decreased.
• Indirect fidelity: If recommendation packets are received uniquely from a neighbor node, then the fidelity is decreased by one and the count value is increased by one.
The count value (C) is a check for blacklisting the culprit node from the network. Once three unique recommendations are received from three different neighbors, the node gets blacklisted. The choice of C is three because it has been observed that the malicious nodes are effectively expelled from the network by all the nodes in the most effective time. We have simulated and found out the average time required by a network to eliminate a malicious node from its network for 10 simulations, with C as 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, as shown in the Table. Relying on a node too much for transmission of the same packet can sometimes prove futile, since the battery power of every node is finite, assuming no infrastructure for charging the battery is available. Thus, continuous transmission through a single node may the drain energy of a node such that it will be unable to send any more packets in the future. Moreover, if a node with a high fidelity value starts behaving maliciously, it would take a lot of time to bring down that node's fidelity value such that other nodes get selected over that malicious node. Hence, a maximum limit on fidelity must be imposed on each neighbor node, as shown in Eq. (2). Let us consider the best case in which all packets are forwarded successfully. The routing packets are used for the route search. The maximum fidelity will be battery power left after route search per DATA and ACK packet transfer.
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Similarly, a minimum fidelity can be calculated with Eq. (3). Let us consider a worst case, where a node has only one neighbor and which drops every ACK packet. Initially the fidelity will be zero and so the minimum fidelity value will be negative. Since after three such cases the node will be blacklisted, the fidelity can be maximum -3 (due to C = 3, but it can be generalized depending on the level of security required). However, there may be a case in which the battery might get over before reaching -count. A value that is closer to zero is chosen, so that the malicious nodes can be avoided.
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Battery threshold calculation
In this section we show the calculation and choice of two battery thresholds, one for an intermediate node µ i and the other for a destination node µ d . These threshold values are highly dependent on the number and types of protocol packets a node has to send. An analysis of these packets for both the intermediate and destination nodes helps us conclude Eqs. (7) and (8).
We present a generalized model for calculating the thresholds of the nodes, which can be used effectively with any mobile ad hoc network and protocol. We try to precalculate the battery required by the next hop. While calculating the thresholds we neglect the battery spent in the idle case. The sender node and the intermediate nodes calculate the threshold µ i (for other intermediate nodes) during the neighbor discovery process, while the destination threshold µ d is calculated by the source node only after the RREP has been received by the source node. Whenever a node sends or receives a packet, it reduces the available energy according to the following parameters: (a) the specific NIC characteristics, (b) the size of the packets, and (c) the bandwidth. Eq. (4) calculates the energy used when a packet p is transmitted, while Eq. (5) calculates the energy used when a packet p is received [21, 22] .
Combining Eqs. (4) and (5) with 6 we get the new modified equations of charge (Q) in mAh unit as mentioned in Eqs. (7) and (8).
Since this charge is dependent on the packet sizes, we analyze the sizes and types of packets used. Thus the total required threshold power for intermediate node is in Eq. (9) and for destination node is in Eq. (10).
where i is the message count, which is incremented for each transmission of RREQ packet, for a particular data path. This helps in determining the number of nodes that are already engaged and busy for a particular data path. Again, n is the number of nodes in the network.
Hardware architecture
In Figure 2 the architecture of one node is shown along with the pin diagram of ZigBee in Figure 3 . The node contains a microprocessor, transreceiver, and LCD to display the details. The high-performance Atmel 8-bit AVR RISC-based microcontroller combines 32 KB ISP flash memory with read-while-write capabilities, 1KB EEPROM, 2KB SRAM, 23 general purpose I/O lines, 32 general purpose working registers, three flexible timer/counters with compare modes, internal and external interrupts, serial programmable USART, a byteoriented 2-wire serial interface, SPI serial port, 6-channel 10-bit A/D converter (8-channels in TQFP and QFN/MLF packages), programmable watchdog timer with internal oscillator, and five software selectable power saving modes. The device operates between 1.8 and 5.5 V. The Rx and Tx are receiver port and transmitter port, respectively. The main function of Tx and Rx is to transmit and receive data to/from the peripheral devices; in our case it is the ZigBee transreceiver. The Tx of Arduino is connected to the data-in of ZigBee and Rx is connected to the data-out of the ZigBee module. The first step to configure the hardware is to configure the ZigBee module which must be paired with the Arduino board. The ZigBee will only detect signals from a same PAN ID, which must be set the same for all the transreceivers. All the transreceivers must have a network ID that will uniquely identify every node in the network. Figure 4 represents the real routing nodes. 
Experimental results
We have simulated the protocol on hardware on our college campus, to observe the feasibility of the system. Some assumptions were made. All the transmitters should belong to the same PAN ID, i.e. while setting up the ZigBee modules it should be kept in mind that all the nodes must belong to the same network ID; otherwise the transreceiver will not detect any signals from the other nodes. In our simulation, we have considered that only one node is sending data and one node is receiving data; the other nodes act as routing nodes. Simple cryptographic symbols are used in the routing algorithm, which can be custom designed according to the use of the network. The nodes move in an enclosed region following a random waypoint model. The speed ranges from 1.4 m/s to 2.5 m/s (average walking speed) with pause time of 30 s. In the first simulation, we consider 4 nodes, as shown in Figure 5 . Since Node 2 has fidelity zero and Node 1 has one, the data are successfully sent through Node 1. Now let Node 1 be a malicious node, with a greyhole attack. As soon as a packet is dropped the fidelity is reduced back to zero and Node 2 is elected, as shown in Figure 6 . The data will be sent through Node 2, unless it drops the packet. 
Results and discussion
An extensive simulation model having a scenario of 10 mobile nodes is used to study interlayer interactions with an area of 50 m × 26 m, with each node's range as 15 m. We have considered Node 1 as the source and Node 10 as the destination node, as shown in Figure 7 . Since PAN users transfer data quite frequently in small amounts, we have considered Node 1 to send 100 data packets to destination Node 10, within a simulation time of 3000 s. When all 10 nodes have started routing and few transmissions have taken place, the nodes 2, 6, and 8 are made malicious. The same scenario has been used for performance evaluation for both our proposed secured routing protocol and other existing secure protocols with which our protocol has been compared, i.e. ARAN [9] , SAODV [12] , TAODV [14] , and FBOD [17] . We consider these protocols, as they are well known. Moreover, we try to show that our protocol is much better than the other secure routing protocols. First, we compute the PDF for all the protocols as shown in Figures 8 and 9 . As we can see from the graph our protocol shows an average PDF of 91.2%, which is decreased to 86.25% in a malicious environment. For other protocols like TAODV, which initially exhibits a fall since it has to go through a trust building phase, after the trust has been built the PDF again increases. FBOD, SAODV, and ARAN show fluctuations in a benign environment and fall in a malicious environment, since none can eliminate the malicious nodes. EMFBOD, on the other hand, uses recommendation packets to blacklist the malicious nodes. The battery judgment stage helps in increasing the PDF, since many of the nodes with low battery value are avoided. Second, we compute the normalized routing load for the protocols in a benign environment as shown in Figures 10 and 11 . Initially, when we consider a benign environment the average NRL for our protocol is 0.96, which increases to 1.1 in a malicious environment. TAODV shows high NRL both in benign and malicious environments, due to its extra packets to build trust. SAODV and ARAN comparatively show average NRL, since with the inclusion of malicious nodes a lot of authentication processes have to take place. In the case of FBOD, through fidelity it measures the trust of the neighbor, but still cannot eliminate these malicious nodes from the network.
Finally, we calculate the end-to-end delay for the protocols in a benign environment as shown in Figures  12 and 13 . As the number of nodes increases, the end-to-end delay increases. Our protocol shows an average delay of 12.8 s in a benign environment and 19.75 s in a malicious environment. EMFBOD shows a smaller increment in the end-to-end delay compared to other protocols, since it can effectively detect and eliminate malicious nodes, thereby bringing the network back to stability. 
Conclusion
The proposed protocol has many unique features, which makes it different from other existing secure on-demand protocols. It is a lightweight protocol and does not require any flooding of extra packets or extra memory. It is a unicast protocol, thereby making the network free from many attacks. The secure route selection mitigates attacks like wormhole and rushing attacks. As the fidelity of other nodes increases the chances of a blackhole node getting selected will decrease. Moreover, the count value monitors the greyhole and blackmail attacks quite efficiently. Our proposed protocol in a benign environment works better or similar to the existing protocols, but Figure 12 . End-to-end delay in benign environment. Figure 13 . End-to-end delay in malicious environment.
in a malicious environment it works better than the other protocols in terms of PDF and end-to-end delay. The NRL, on the other hand, is average compared to the others, which is a tradeoff required for secure routing with minimum delay and higher PDF. Although we see from the performance metrics that our PAN implementation works better in a malicious environment than other popular secure routing protocols, there is still scope for more improvement in the QoS. Producing intelligence secure routing through swarm intelligence (SI) is one of the emerging areas of MANETs.
